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Abstract
This paper examines how charitable giving offers an example of lay morality, re-
flecting people’s capacity for fellow-feeling, moral sentiments, personal reflexivity,
ethical dispositions, moral norms and moral discourses. Lay morality refers to how
people should treat others and be treated by them, matters that are important for
their subjective and objective well-being. It is a first person evaluative relation to
the world (about things that matter to people). While the paper is sympathetic
to the ‘moral boundaries’ approach, which seeks to address the neglect of moral
evaluations in sociology, it reveals this approach to have some shortcomings. The
paper argues that although morality is always mediated by cultural discourses and
shaped by structural factors, it also has a universalizing character because people
have fellow-feelings, shared human conditions, and have reason to value.
Keywords: charitable giving, lay morality, sympathy, reflexivity, social inequalities
This paper examines how charitable giving offers an example of lay morality,
reflecting people’s capacity for fellow-feeling, moral sentiments, personal re-
flexivity, ethical dispositions, moral norms and moral discourses (Sayer, 2010).
It will show that while moral evaluations can be sensitive to people’s social posi-
tions and cultural scripts of what and who deserve attention, moral evaluations
can also be less sensitive to the social positions of those making the evaluations
and of those being evaluated. People can deliberate on the basis to be the per-
son that they have reason to want to be. The paper will argue that the ‘moral
boundaries’ framework underestimates the importance of fellow-feelings (or
sympathy), common human conditions and reason to value in shaping moral
judgements.
Charitable giving is largely neglected in social science, partly because sociol-
ogy tends to be cynical of people’s normative practices, casting doubt on their
genuine moral concerns, and trying to reveal the economic and political mo-
tives for their purportedly disinterested behaviour. For instance, Bourdieu’s
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(1984, 1990) work on symbolic capital, habitus and social field offers a remark-
able framework for analysing how social actors’ cultural practices can conceal
forms of symbolic domination that help to reproduce social inequalities. But
people’s moral evaluations are missing in his work, which focuses instead on
the mechanics of the deliberate mis-recognition of the economic in cultural
and aesthetic tastes (Lamont, 1992; Sayer, 2005). On the few occasions Bour-
dieu writes about philanthropy, he is cynical and dismissive (see also Silber,
2009; Graeber, 2011). Similarly, Foucault’s (1980, 2006) work on discourses
and power provides an impressive framework for understanding how people’s
subjectivities are socially constructed according to political rationalities and
social arrangements, which are themselves forms of subjugation and control.
Foucault himself was scathing of the mental health reforms pioneered by 19th
century philanthropists, dismissing their humane actions as a way of controlling
patients, replacing chains with compassion (see also Fraser, 1981).
While it is right that sociology exposes the different ways in which power and
domination are manifested and misrecognized in social practices and relation-
ships, there is a danger of overreach and committing disciplinary imperialism
(Sayer, 2000). There are some good reasons to be wary of attempts to sociolo-
gize and reduce morality to social constructs and power relations. While moral
concerns and values are always understood and articulated through existing
cultural discourses, and are always conditioned by historical and structural fac-
tors, they are often about things of significance for human flourishing that exist
independently of our conceptions of them. If this were not so, we could hardly
make mistakes about moral evaluations, and revise them in light of personal
experiences of disappointment, frustration and pain. Furthermore, if ethics is
no more than a form of symbolic domination and power, on what basis can
we adjudicate between competing ethical claims? Why would giving money to
a children’s charity be better or worse than contributing to a racist organiza-
tion? By having a conception of human flourishing and harm, moral relativism
and an ‘anything goes’ approach can be avoided (see Nussbaum, 2000; Sayer,
2003).
In this paper, I will examine how charitable giving offers an example of what
Sayer (2011) terms lay morality, as understood by ordinary individuals and
shaped by cultural and social factors. The first section will explore the nature of
lay morality, offering some critical remarks on the concept of moral boundaries.
I will describe the research design and methods in the second section. In
the third section, key findings will be discussed, in particular examining how
charitable giving reflects social actors’ different moral concerns and social
circumstances. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks.
Theoretical frameworks on charitable giving
This section will begin by examining how Lamont’s (1992, 2000) theoretical
framework on social and moral boundaries addresses charitable giving. After
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offering some criticisms of the concept of moral boundaries, it will suggest an
alternative approach based on the idea of lay morality.
Moral boundaries, volunteering and altruism
The recent theoretical development on boundary work by Lamont (1992, 2000)
and Kefalas (2003) provides a useful understanding of how class, ‘race’ and
the nation-state can shape social and moral evaluations, generating a range
of judgements on work, social stratification, neighbourhoods, the home, the
polity, patriotism, volunteering and altruism. Social actors evaluate themselves
in relation to others using socio-economic, cultural and moral criteria, such as
income, power, tastes, intelligence, manners and personal and religious values.
They draw social, moral, cultural and racial boundaries that allow them to
achieve a sense of dignity and moral worth by constructing similarities and
differences between themselves and others. Broad cultural repertoires and
historical and structural conditions help social actors to construct exclusionary
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
In her cross-cultural studies on white and black working and upper-middle-
class men in the US and France, Lamont (1992, 2000) describes how working-
class men feel economically inferior to upper-middle-class men, lacking money,
status and influence, but consider themselves to be morally superior because
they make sacrifices for the family ahead of personal achievements and value
friendship over competition. Although white and black working-class men
agree on their criticisms of upper-middle-class men, who are characterized
as being selfish, overly competitive and disingenuous, their evaluations of
poor and disadvantaged groups differ. The African-American history and ex-
perience of slavery, racial discrimination and the civil rights movement are
reflected in black working-class men’s structural understanding of social in-
equality and poverty, in contrast to the individualist perspective offered by
their white working-class counterparts. Black men are sympathetic, caring and
supportive towards poor and homeless groups, valuing solidarity and cooper-
ation and not feeling morally superior to them. In contrast, Lamont argues,
white American working-class men draw upon a different set of cultural reper-
toires, including the fantasy of the American dream, moral individualism and
the Protestant work ethic (cf. Graeber, 2007, 2011). In developing a strong
sense of self-responsibility and discipline, they criticize poor, disadvantaged
and black groups for lacking such qualities, and accuse them of being irrespon-
sible, dishonest, lazy and undeserving of welfare assistance (Lamont, 2000).
For instance, white working-class men describe the homeless as having ‘given
up’, resent that poor groups receive help from the state, and associate black
people with crime and welfare dependency.
Lamont (2000) finds that altruism in the US is not framed in terms of social
solidarity and common humanity, but rather as being practical and technical,
based on individualistic and religious beliefs. Volunteering and donations aim
to provide immediate relief on a case-by-case basis, designed to alleviate the
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recipients’ pain and suffering, rather than to tackle underlying injustices. La-
mont shows how having an individualistic understanding of inequality and
poverty, white working-class men distinguish between deserving and unde-
serving recipients of charity, associating the latter with immoral behaviour,
such as drugs, alcohol and sex. She maintains that it is their religious faith and
teachings, not principles of social justice and solidarity, which extol the moral
virtues of compassion and generosity.
Whereas African-Americans draw a weak moral boundary towards poor
and marginalized groups that allows them to perform charitable works to assist
them, white working men are individualistic and draw strong moral and social
boundaries against people below them (Lamont, 2000). White working-class
men are ambivalent about charity, and are moved by local and personal mo-
tivations. Kefelas (2003) in her study on a white working-class community in
Chicago argues that volunteering and altruism (eg, faith groups and civic neigh-
bourhood associations) are anchored to local issues (such as children’s sport
activities, security and public cleanliness) that help to ensure a moral order
and stability in the community. White working-class families have precarious
economic lives, and feel threatened by the uncertainty and fear arising from
their close proximity to poor and black neighbourhoods. Unable to escape
to white middle-class suburban areas, they are protective of their commu-
nity, fearing that an encroachment of black and poor families into the area
would have a detrimental impact on house prices and their retirement saving
plans.
In contrast to white working-class men, Lamont (1992) argues that white
American upper-middle-class men view charities and voluntary associations as
a way of gaining respect in the community, establishing their social reputation,
and becoming part of the local elite. Beside the intrinsic satisfaction that char-
itable giving and volunteering can provide, they have an instrumental value,
being an important source of friendship given the white elite’s high degree of
geographical mobility. Lamont (1999: 60) notes that charity can also have a
reciprocal value, allowing the white upper-middle-class to ‘give back’ to the
community, though the ‘community’ is equated with ‘people like us’, people
defined by common ethnicity, religion and proximity. But, she argues, French
white upper-middle-class men have a different perspective on charity, object-
ing to it for political reasons: poor and disadvantaged groups have a right to be
helped, and should not be forced to rely on the whims of the rich or individual
paternalistic sentiments. They think that the state has a collective responsibility
to support marginalized groups. For these reasons, Lamont argues that French
white upper-middle-class men do not regard volunteering as a good indicator
of moral character but, instead, they express their compassion through their
willingness to support a strong welfare state.
Although the boundary work framework offers some insights into how
class and ‘race’ can shape charitable giving and volunteering, it does have
some limitations. First, whereas cultural and socio-economic positional goods
(such as tastes, education, income and power) tend to be monopolized by
297C© 2015 The Author. The Sociological Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of the
Editorial Board of The Sociological Review
Balihar Sanghera
particular social groups operating in competitive social spheres with the aim
to exclude or dominate others, morality is not a positional good. It is odd to
think that just because a social group has more of a particular moral virtue, say
compassion, others are likely to have or enjoy it less. Furthermore, morality
has a universalizing character, in that social actors usually argue that their
moral evaluations, reasons and virtues are good not only for them, but also for
others, irrespective of class, gender and ‘race’. Unlike cultural and aesthetic
judgements, moral evaluations matter because they are about how to treat and
be treated by others and affect people’s subjective and objective well-being.
People undertake actions and activities to be the person that they have reason
to want to be. In contrast to the cynical depiction of American people as being
morally individualistic and self-interested, Graeber (2007, 2011) argues that
the American society is better conceived as a battle over access to the means to
behave altruistically. Lacking cultural and social capital to pursue higher, more
noble, career goals, say, in the art world, the third sector, education, politics
or journalism, many white and black American working-class people join the
army, believing that it will offer them an opportunity to live a life of adventure
and camaraderie, in which they will do something genuinely noble and do good
in the world (eg, giving free dental examinations to villagers).
Second, the metaphor of moral boundaries ignores the capacity of social ac-
tors to have sympathy for others, to imagine their situations, and to approve or
disapprove of their actions (Smith, 1976). Without sympathy, social interaction
would be difficult, and moral sentiments cannot emerge. Sympathy also enables
social actors to criticize members of their own class and racial community for
immoral behaviour (eg, dishonesty and child abuse), and to praise the moral
virtues and actions of those from other communities. Making judgements of
what is good and bad, just and unjust need not be constrained by class or racial
boundaries.
Lay morality
Sayer (2005) notes that lay morality refers to how people should treat others
and be treated by them, matters that are important for their subjective and
objective well-being. While power, interests, reciprocity, discourses, discipline,
socialization, habits and conventions are useful for an external description of
people’s actions, they miss the first person evaluative relation to the world and
the force of their evaluations (Sayer, 2011). Lay morality reflects ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ ethical issues of justice and rights and of care and love. It implies an ev-
eryday, rather than a philosophical, conception of the good life, which is always
understood and articulated through existing cultural resources and discourses,
and is shaped by historical and structural conditions. While lay morality can
be formalized in social norms and rules and discursively articulated and legit-
imatized, it also takes on a visceral and embodied form of moral sentiments
and dispositions, learnt and developed through ongoing social interaction,
as described by Smith (1976). Some scholars, such as Bourdieu (1984) and
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Lamont (1992, 2000), describe how social and moral evaluations are sensitive
to and influenced by social status, but Sayer (2005) argues that moral judge-
ments can also be less sensitive to people’s social positions. As already noted,
moral evaluations can have a universalizing character.
Lay morality is a product of several interacting elements, which are socially
variable (Sayer, 2010). First, moral sentiments (including compassion, self-
interest and indignation) are fallible but intelligent responses to situations that
affect individuals’ moral concerns and goals, such as familial relations, practi-
cal achievements and social values (Archer, 2000). Sentiments are not merely
subjective, but are about things that have real impact on human flourishing and
social suffering (Nussbaum, 2001). Immoral sentiments (such as contempt, ar-
rogance and submissiveness) also occur, often arising from situations of power
asymmetry. Moral and immoral sentiments possess causal powers, moving
and motivating people to take actions in response to their situation. As peo-
ple’s emotions reflect their social experiences, differences in emotions emerge.
For instance, class inequalities tend to produce negative sentiments, such as
working-class shame and envy, and middle-class contempt and anxiety. Ray
(2014) shows that shame is situated within structural and cultural conditions
that are likely to evoke shame, and that class shame can move humiliated and
despised working-class men to riot and loot, both performing an act of defi-
ance against the legitimate culture and expressing normative justifications for
transgression.
Second, as Sayer (2010) argues, fellow-feeling (or the ability to understand
others) is a pre-condition of everyday moral conduct, and is crucial for social
interaction. Through experiencing or imagining certain good and bad events
themselves, people have a degree of insight into others’ experiences and situ-
ations, enabling them to compare and evaluate their own and others’ actions.
The capacity for fellow-feeling is variable with some groups, such as autistic
individuals, finding sympathy and social interaction difficult. Moreover, sym-
pathy can be countered by moral blase´; for example, contemporary societies
are saturated with media reports and images of suffering and tragedy that can
result in emotional and political indifference to others’ appalling conditions
(Boltanski, 1999).
Third, social actors acquire particular moral dispositions (or virtues and
vices), which are learnt and repeated behaviour (Sayer, 2010). For instance,
trainee teachers and nurses learn to be attentive to the needs of their pupils and
patients, developing over time caring dispositions. Early socialization, moral
education and social context can also shape people’s moral traits; for example,
strong child–parent attachment and humanist teaching can encourage children
to be trusting, honest, generous and respectful towards strangers. Class, gender
and ‘race’ are also likely to affect people’s moral dispositions and behaviour;
for example, a middle-class sense of entitlement and superiority, gendered
care and modesty, and racial distrust and loyalty (see also Reay, 2006; Gilligan,
1990; Lamont, 2000).
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Fourth, norms are an important guide for what conduct is and is not appro-
priate without the need for too much deliberation (Smith, 1976). Moral norms
are distinguished from other norms because they have significant implications
for human flourishing (Sayer, 2010). For instance, religious almsgiving, such
as Christian tithes and Islamic ‘zakat’, is not merely a religious observance
for believers, but is also about something independent of itself, namely, how
people can live together in which they have regard for each other’s well-being
(see also Mahmood, 2003). Moral norms are always contestable, as different
groups struggle over ideas of what constitutes human well-being.
Fifth, morality is always culturally mediated: moral discourses, stories,
myths, fantasies and symbols provide people with ways to understand, shape
and reason about how to treat and be treated by others (Sayer, 2011). Moral
discourses are always contested, reflecting diverse, complex and often conflict-
ing ideas about human dignity and flourishing. Social actors can be mistaken in
thinking that particular discourses have good argumentations for achieving hu-
man well-being, which exists independently of their particular conceptions of it.
The relationship between moral discourses and social inequalities is also com-
plex, sometimes resulting in harm and suffering. For instance, Skeggs (1997)
argues that while working-class women demand to be treated with equal respect
and dignity, they develop their own moral form of respectability, but lacking
the necessary cultural and economic capital, they sometimes experience fear,
humiliation, resentment and hatred.
Sixth, individuals are reflexive beings, who interpret the world in relation
to things that matter to them, deliberating and prioritizing multiple moral
concerns and commitments (Archer, 2007). Reflexivity ranges from intense,
and sometimes critical, deliberations through to more fleeting and fragmented
reflections as part of the stream of consciousness. The more important the
decision, the more intense the deliberation, as social actors are likely to ask
themselves how effective their actions will be and how others will view them
(Sayer, 2010). People are attentive to how they and the things they care about
are faring and how others regard them. Furthermore, personal reflexivity is
socially variable; for example, individuals who have a stronger commitment to
social justice than to, say, practical achievements are likely to engage in more
critical internal conversations on the mis-match between their life projects and
goals and their social milieu (Archer, 2007).
It is worth noting that the lay morality approach avoids two common mis-
takes in conceptualizing moral evaluations. First, it rejects a strong version
of social constructionism, which reduces morality to cultural discourses and
power, and ignores the importance of the social ontology of a human being
as a vulnerable, interdependent, needy and evaluative person (Sayer, 2004).
Strong social constructionism is unable to make sense of how social actors can
be mistaken about what constitutes human well-being, and their attempts to
revise their ideas and conduct in light of their subjective and objective ill-being.
Second, it avoids a strong version of human essentialism, which posits that hu-
man qualities are fixed and universal, and fails to consider how ongoing social
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interaction and inequalities can shape moral evaluations. Morality is always
interpreted through available cultural resources, and human qualities – such as
moral sentiments and dispositions – are socially variable and contingent. But
while moral judgements can be sensitive to social positions, they can also be
insensitive to them, having a universalizing character.
Research design and methods
Between 2008 and 2009, I conducted in-depth interviews with 41 individuals
from a range of occupations, including public sector administrators, university
lecturers, social care workers, home-keepers, self-employed workers, mature
students and retirees. Most of the interviews were conducted in Kent, south-
east of the UK. Almost all the interviewees were recruited through mass emails
to several local public and charity organizations, asking people to participate
in a research project on giving and volunteering. All those who responded
were subsequently interviewed. The sample was not completely random, as
five interviewees were specifically approached in order to have more ‘black’
and middle-class donors in the sample.
The semi-structured interviews consisted of two parts, lasting on average
two and a quarter hours. The first part asked the interviewees to recount their
life history, describing their life from their early upbringing and schooling
through to their current family and work situation, their personal goals and
their routines. Interview questions included, ‘Can you please tell me some-
thing about yourself from childhood and schooling to adult life’, ‘What were
the important events or who were key people in your life?’, ‘Can you please
describe your typical day and week’, and ‘Typically over a month or a year,
can you say what do you do together with your neighbours / people on your
street / members in the local community. Or maybe what you do for them?’
This part of the interview aimed to grasp how the interviewees understood
and interpreted their own life; more specifically, what were their key moral
concerns, what were they attentive to, how did these things change over time,
and how were charitable acts embedded into their daily, weekly or monthly
routines.
In the second part, interviewees were asked to recall their acts of giving
and volunteering, and to describe their feelings and motivations. Interview
questions included, ‘Recall an incident when you gave money or time to a
charity, a cause or someone to help out, talk me through how it began, what
were you thinking and feeling?’, ‘What were the reasons and motivations for
this particular action and its timing?’, ‘Can you say something about whether
your friends, family members and work colleagues give money or volunteer?’,
‘Of the money and time you have given to things, causes or people, which
one has meant the most and the least to you?’, and ‘Can you say why giv-
ing or helping out matters to you?’ This part of the interview aimed to grasp
how charitable acts are understood and interpreted, what reasons and moti-
vations were given for them, and how other people shaped their donations.
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Overall, a picture emerged of how interviewees navigated their way through
the world, being attentive to things of importance to their well-being, and to
what extent charitable giving was a meaningful and significant activity in their
lives.
The interviewees were assigned a social class using multi-dimensional cri-
teria: social class upbringing (working or middle-class parents based on their
occupations), educational qualifications (school, college or university), occu-
pation (unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled or professional), and economic house-
hold situation (struggling to make ends meet, managing to cope or having a
comfortable lifestyle). In addition, some interviewees defined themselves into
a particular social class, sometimes using euphemisms such as ‘common as
muck’, ‘being privileged’ and ‘don’t worry about money’. Based on the inter-
view data, the sample consisted of 19 working-class people, 16 lower-middle-
class and 6 upper-middle-class. Working-class participants possessed a much
lower volume of cultural, social and economic capital than their middle-class
counterparts, and the upper-middle-class participants had significantly greater
cultural and economic capital (in particular education and profession) than the
lower-middle-class participants. [Correction added on 15 April 2016, after first
online publication: Sample data figures which were previously wrongly stated
as 21, 13 and 7 have now been corrected as 19, 16 and 6 respectively in this
version.]
In terms of gender composition, 25 women, 15 men and one transgender
person participated in the research. The sample also consisted of five ‘black’
interviewees (three British-Asians, one African immigrant and one Iranian
immigrant) and three ‘white’ immigrants (one Argentinean, one Greek Cypriot
and one South African). The rest were white British, of whom one was Welsh.
The study also had seven retirees, of whom one was a part-time lay clergy and
three were involved in managing local civic associations (a table tennis club,
a residents’ housing association and a naval heritage charity). There were two
young undergraduates, just about to complete their degrees. Most interviewees
were young and middle-aged adults, and a few were approaching retirement.
All interviews were digitally recorded, and interviewees were reassured
about confidentiality and anonymity. The interviews were transcribed, and
then the transcripts were returned to them to check and edit. Only a few made
slight alterations to the text, correcting minor factual details. The subsequent
analysis was based on themes I developed after reading the transcripts a couple
of times. Most themes, such as ‘giving money’, ‘giving time’, ‘values’, ‘faith’,
‘tithes’, ‘caring for others’, ‘character’, ‘reflections upon giving’, ‘informal giv-
ing’ and ‘why giving matters’, were shared across the transcripts. Some themes,
including ‘justice’, ‘activism’, ‘strategic giving’, ‘self-interest’, ‘family and chil-
dren’ and ‘sympathy’, were more evident in some transcripts than others. After
the data had been thematized, I was able to see similarities and differences
among the participants, especially noting how significant and meaningful char-
itable giving was in their lives. For some, charitable giving played an important
part in their lives, whereas for others it was incidental.
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The moral and social aspects of charitable giving
This section will discuss how the various elements of lay morality shape chari-
table giving, beginning with people’s capacity for fellow-feeling. Social actors
can sympathize with others who have suffered injustice, having experienced
similar or related forms of injustice (Sayer, 2010). Eve, a working-class part-
time hospital porter, gives to Shelter, a homeless charity, because the issue is
close to her heart, having been homeless herself and knowing homeless people
to be vulnerable to events outside their control:
I feel passionate about homeless, it’s because of stories like that and also people
living in temporary housing and things like this, that’s what really, really gets to
me.... There was a period when my mum kicked me out, I was homeless and there’s
been periods where my sisters have been kicked out,... so it is kind of close to me....
For example, a single mother with three children whose other half batters her. She
will have to go and get temporary housing to be housed away from him and then
she’ll be left in there for two year. That’s not her fault.... That’s just a bad situation,
bad circumstances, bad luck really and a lot of the people who are homeless, it’s
just bad luck that’s befallen them and so they need help really and the government
doesn’t help them and they fall through the net, so and it’s sad and not enough
people really care about it as far as I can see. There’s too much of this, kind of, it’s
their own fault sort of idea.
In addition to being sympathetic and compassionate, Eve is angry that the
government does not provide sufficient temporary and emergency accommo-
dation. She is also critical of the way the media often blame homeless people for
their own plight without understanding how bad luck affects their lives, some
coming from broken and abusive homes. Her donation to Shelter reflects both
compassion and justice. She is attentive to homelessness in several other ways.
For instance, she supports her local church’s initiative to provide temporary
accommodation to homeless people, gives cigarettes and sits next to people
sleeping rough outside, and sometimes invites some of them to her home to
sleep on the sofa.
Women’s experience of abuse and violence can heighten their sensitivity
to such and related forms of suffering and injustice, moving and motivating
them to take actions (Walker, 2006). Four female interviewees describe how as
children they had been physically or sexually abused for several years, leaving
them traumatized, resentful and distrustful, unable to speak to others about
their experience until they were much older. Rachel, a working-class house-
keeper, who had been sexually abused as a child, regularly donates to the
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), hoping
that the charity will protect children from harm and will enable abused children
to talk to someone to get help:
I do like you know, give money to NSPCC that’s just, I have done that for years....
I think that they do a great job.... It’s just part of my life, that’s what I do... I kind
of think there are children out there that are being abused and everything and they
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need, it’s a really good charity that help people. There is that part of me that thinks
that you know I never come across when I was, when I needed it, but you would hope,
I don’t know that, you know that they do, that they are trying to protect children
aren’t they?
Giving to NSPCC is part of Rachel’s life because of her childhood experience.
She understands what abused children go through, the sense of loneliness,
uncertainty and fear. She had wished that there had been more support for
her, rather than feeling abandoned by people around her. She criticizes her
school for not delving further into her truancy and poor academic performance,
noting that she had been an A-grade pupil before the abuse began. Rachel is
also a school governor at her children’s school and fundraises for their local
majorettes club, so that they and other children can travel abroad to perform.
While her charitable activities benefit her children, she also feels an obligation
towards other children:
I do lots of things in school like the reading and everything, the teachers haven’t got
time to read to the children anymore and the two classes I go to it’s nothing to do
with my children. I could say I only want to do my own children, but you know to
be honest I like reading to some of the others, getting to know some of the other
children and helping them. So, yeah I think it’s good in that way I can go into school,
I haven’t got it that everything’s got to be around my own, I quite like that.
Rachel is sympathetic towards other children, who are in the similar situation
to her own children. Her sense of care expands beyond her own family circle
towards others in the local school. As Smith (1976) notes, sympathy and a
feeling of moral responsibility are easier to elicit the closer others’ situations
are to one’s own.
While relations of care have many positive qualities, they are also associ-
ated with power and strongly gendered, with women undertaking much of the
burden of care (Tronto, 1994). Women’s sympathy for the plight of others can
produce feelings of guilt and responsibility, resulting in them accepting care
responsibilities for fear of not letting others down (Skeggs, 1997). Madeleine, a
middle-class estate agent, felt pressurized into becoming a supervisor of a local
Scout group because it did not have anyone managing it and was threatened
with closure. She felt obligated to help local mothers who struggle with the
daily pressures of family and work life and who were dependent upon her to
keep the Scout group running:
A lot of mothers always feel guilty that you’re not doing enough for your children....
I was depressed for a number of years and probably wasn’t the best mother in the
world, and I’m thinking maybe I can make up the shortfalls that I had with my
children with other children, and that will somehow compensate.... I sort of think
maybe there are other people going through those kinds of hard times and I would
like somebody to be able to do that for my children, to be able to give them a good
experience when I’m having a hard time. So if I can do it for other people’s children,
then maybe because we have got children that come that obviously don’t always have
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the happiest of times so just for that one hour I can be super-mum or super-leader
[at the Scout group].
Madeleine reflects on how she and other parents are vulnerable and needy
beings, and are dependent upon each other. Her maternal guilt moves her
to become a ‘super-mum’, providing relief and help to other parents at the
Scout club. While such sentiments and roles are clearly gendered and socially
constructed, they also reflect an internal normative force relating to human
fragility, neediness and interdependency. Charitable giving, and more generally
lay morality, fuses ethical concerns with cultural scripts and social positions.
As Sayer (2011) notes, morality and power can be discussed simultaneously,
without reducing the former to the latter. This understanding of charitable
giving, and more generally moral evaluations, is quite different to Lamont’s
moral boundaries approach, which also understates the significance of gender.
Of course, recognition of injustice and suffering can come from political
discourse, as well as from personal experience. People are reflexive about
what values should guide them (Archer, 2000). Kamela, an upper-middle-class
information technology manager, is an active member of her local community.
She regularly donates money to her parish church, volunteers as a member
of the Independent Monitoring Board which inspects prison conditions, and
helps with fundraising activities at her local school and church fetes. She notes
that people depend upon various associations and communities to flourish, and
condemns individualism for impoverishing society:
Because no man’s an island. You know we’re all interconnected, and most of us
wanna go through life with people being nice to us, and not being sort of cynical
and thinking ‘Oh, I’m alright Jack!’... We’re not gonna have the best society we
can, unless people are prepared to give.... We went a lot wrong in our society in the
Thatcher years, when everybody thought it was okay to make lots of money and ‘I’m
alright Jack, and stuff you!’, and what does it matter if I make a fortune on the back
of three million unemployed, you know, I’m okay, my family’s okay. You know,
it really annoys me when people say charity begins at home, what you mean just
within that four walls, you know, what is home? Home’s big? You know, I believe
in communities, I believe in church communities, school communities, you know,
guides and cubs and that sort of thing.... So I just think we’re a poorer society if we
don’t give.
Kamela’s charitable activities are framed in terms of communal and collective
values, critical of social and moral ideas that fail to appreciate how people are
interconnected and rely on each other for care and support. She believes that
an excessive focus on the self and the family can threaten social solidarity and
civil society, and laments how people’s lives are often sacrificed for profit.
Sayer (2010) argues that the capacity for fellow-feeling means that even
though social actors may appear to be self-absorbed for much of the time, they
usually tend to help, respect and be friendly to others some of the time. Moral
stories, religious celebrations and national events (such as biblical parables,
Christmas and Armistice Day) can alter people’s consciousness in the direction
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of unselfishness, connecting consciousness to moral virtue (see also Murdoch,
1970). Paul, a former working-class commercial engineer now retired, donates
to several Christmas charities:
I’d also give, you know, to certain Christmas charities because I think, you know,
there’s always a tradition in Britain that at Christmas you like to think of people who
are not as fortunate as you. And when I was a child, when we had our Christmas
dinner, my parents, you know, would always think of people who were less fortunate
than ourselves, because I think it’s very important that you do that, you know, at least
I think if you’re thinking about people it’s better than not thinking about them....
Some people would probably say, ‘Well you can afford to give a lot more than that!’
Well maybe I could, but I give... I’m doing something and because it’s a part of the
way I was brought up, what Christmas is about, you know and the way we are.
Paul was brought up to reflect upon Christmas as an important time of year
to think about less fortunate groups, evoking acts of generosity. In part, the
Nativity story reminds people to show kindness to strangers, the homeless and
those in distress. The media sometimes emphasize the moral significance of
Christmas, reporting on how local religious communities and charities organize
soup kitchens and temporary accommodations for the homeless.
Smith (1976) argues that given that human beings are prone to self-love and
self-deceit, moral norms and rules provide an important source of guidance
on how to act in particular situations. For instance, several interviewees try to
adhere to religious norms on almsgiving, which stipulate that a percentage of
their income must be donated to their place of worship for community service
and public benefit. Often the rules are not strictly followed, causing individuals
to feel guilty, as Ravinder, a British-Asian lower-middle-class police clerk,
explains:
I give money to the temple I go to, because in my faith, I’m supposed to give one
tenth of my earning to God in appreciation of what God has given me to thank him,
to say thank you for your blessings, for your mercy or your kindness, whose creation
is yours for which we are thankful. It’s like saying grace at a table, at the meal, saying
thank you Lord for your food or whatever, and I’ll give money once a year to the
temple and the temple uses the money to various projects that they have to help the
community both here and in India.... I don’t do one tenth, and I feel guilty for not
doing one tenth, but it’s a question of having to afford one tenth, as to can I afford to
give one tenth, and I feel I can’t afford to give one tenth, so I give what I can afford.
Ravinder believes that she has a religious duty to give one tenth of income
to her local Sikh temple in gratitude to God’s blessings and mercy, but she
is unable to fulfil it completely. Instead she gives as much as she can. Giving
cannot be read off from religious norms, as individuals always reflect upon
them, having a degree of personal autonomy and power in deciding whether
to follow, repudiate or adapt them (Archer, 2000). It is worth noting that
Ravinder’s duty to give is not only an act of religious devotion, but also, as
she notes, a way for the temple to support vulnerable and needy members of
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the local Sikh community and poor groups in India, reflecting people’s moral
obligations to disadvantaged and marginalized groups.
Lay ethical practices are not merely the product of moral sentiments, con-
cerns, norms and reflections, but are also unevenly structured according to
people’s relative status, power and interests in the social field (Sayer, 2011).
Sensitivity about social recognition and symbolic power can be reflected in
their charitable giving, in that rich and middle-class people are more likely to
engage in particular forms of giving and volunteering that validate and legit-
imize their social position (Curtis, 1997; Shapely, 2001). The study shows that
middle-class people tend to over-value charitable causes and practices (such as
education, the arts, international development and professional skills) associ-
ated with the dominant symbolic culture, and to under-value things (including
charity shops, crafts and manual labour) associated with the subordinate cul-
ture. Zoe¨, an upper-middle-class university lecturer, enjoys giving occasional
lectures for free to the Workers’ Educational Association, a non-profit adult
educational institute:
I tend to do some teaching for the Workers’ Educational Association.... I’ll teach for
nothing.... It’s just a really good thing to be doing, everyone’s getting a lot out of it,
people like it. I get a lot out of it too.... It’s great to be able to see people engaging
and taking off.
While teaching English literature pro bono is partly motivated by democratic
and progressive ideals to educate mature adults who otherwise would not have
access to formal education, Zoe¨’s actions also serve to valorize her cultural
capital, receiving praise and social recognition from others. Rather than opting
for cynical or reductionist interpretations of giving as disguised self-interested
or class behaviour, it is more accurate to explain it as motivated by mixed
sentiments (namely, sympathy, justice and self-interest) and multiple concerns,
including practical achievement and social causes, recognizing that people are
sometimes disposed to over-value things that are agreeable and advantageous
to their situation (Smith, 1976).
People’s moral expectations of themselves and others partly depend upon
how they attribute responsibility and blame for social issues and circumstances.
Sayer (2011) argues that in determining responsibility people often underes-
timate the role of social influences on what they and others are able and
motivated to do. Several white interviewees believe that poverty and underde-
velopment in low-income countries are due to corrupt and wasteful actions of
governments and international agencies, underestimating the effects of global
finance, trade flows, corporate power and geo-politics on national economies.
Richard, a former lower-middle-class publicity officer now retired, does not
donate to international development charities, being very critical of aid pro-
grammes in Africa:
As for these charities that are installing pumps in African villages, Africa must be
knee deep in pumps by now, for 50 years people have been contributing their ten
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bob or whatever it was to put a pump in an African village, there can’t be that many
villages, so somebody somewhere is doing very nicely out of this and it’s probably the
pump manufacturer.... We were giving independence to countries that were nowhere
near ready for independence, all that happened was that they became over-ruled by
despots and none of them were as well off as they were when they were part of the
British Empire and certainly Zimbabwe is a classic example of this, if you wanted
an excuse for empire that would be it.
Richard sneers at the idea that international development charities can pro-
duce good work, feeling that the charity industry and African state officials
are corrupt. He ridicules many African countries, believing that they were not
ready for independence and would have been better served if they had re-
mained within the British Commonwealth. His account depoliticizes economic
development by minimizing the effects of post-colonial and global economic
factors, and highlighting instead the failings of African leaders and state of-
ficials. While attributing responsibility and blame can be a product of moral
reasoning, it can also be structured according to people’s relative positions in
the social field, so that social class, gender and ‘race’ have a bearing upon how
they think about social issues and problems.
Conclusion
I have examined how lay morality can provide some insights into the na-
ture of charitable giving, reflecting people’s capacity for fellow-feeling, moral
sentiments, personal reflexivity, ethical dispositions, moral norms and moral
discourses. The paper aimed to avoid strong forms of social constructionism
and essentialism: the former overlooks the importance of the social ontology
of human beings as vulnerable, independent and needy individuals, who in-
terpret the world in relation to their moral concerns; and the latter ignores
how social actors always describe their situations through available cultural
resources, and are shaped by historical and structural factors. The paper also
argued that the concept of moral boundaries fails to appreciate how people’s
moral evaluations are good not only for them, but also for others, irrespective
of class, gender and ‘race’, largely because of sympathy and the universaliz-
ing quality of morality. This does not mean that people’s moral judgements
are not socially variable; as we demonstrated, charitable giving is inflected
by class, gender, ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. Nor does it mean that their moral
evaluations are without problems; as we saw, social inequalities and preju-
dices can be reflected in charitable giving, helping to reproduce structural
injustices.
Some readers may be reluctant to embrace ideas of common human con-
ditions (or the social ontology of human being) and morality’s universalizing
quality to cut across social positions, pointing out that moral evaluations are so-
cially constructed and variable across history and cultures, and that power and
interests shape morality. Sayer (2011) notes that this reluctance can arise from
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the fear that acknowledging such things implies essentialism, psychologism,
determinism or homogenization, though, as we have noted, social variability
is quite compatible with the social ontology of human being and transnational
values. Another reason for the reluctance can be driven by sociological im-
perialism, meaning that sociology aims to extend its reach to the exclusion of
other disciplines, imagining that it is the most fundamental and insightful social
science (Sayer, 2000).
The irony is that there are always implicit moral evaluations in sociological
descriptions and explanations of social reality, usually in the form of condem-
nations of suffering, domination, violence and harm inflicted upon sentient and
social beings. Such ethical evaluations matter, otherwise why would sociolo-
gists care to examine the effects of social structures and inequalities. Moreover,
people, including sociologists, criticize others for mis-treating them, and justify
to others the things that matter to them, arguing that respect, dignity, fairness,
justice and equality have a degree of validity, objectivity and truth beyond
their own social group. Of course, their articulations and evaluations of what
constitute human well-being are contestable and fallible, suggesting that it ex-
ists independently of their particular conceptions of it, otherwise there would
be nothing to discuss and debate about. While moral judgements and prac-
tices are inflected by power and interests, they are not determined by them,
otherwise adjudicating between competing sets of moral values would become
either arbitrary or an exercise of power.
Finally, let me address another source of unease that some readers may
have. The paper implies that social actors can be mistaken about their moral
evaluations of people and things, over-valuing and belittling objects that help
to validate and legitimize their social position and symbolic dominance in the
social field. Readers may ask on what basis, if at all, good or bad judgements can
be made. Sociologists often explicitly avoid both judging the subjects they study
and proposing ideas for a flourishing or damaging life, possibly for fear of being
labelled unscientific, ethnocentric or essentialist. Though they invariably slip
normative values into their analysis, recognizing particular forms of power to be
oppressive and harmful – this partly explains their motivation to study issues
like domestic abuse and racism. Without knowing what and why particular
things are damaging or valuable, sociologists’ critique of power and domination
loses meaning (Sayer, 2003). While sociologists may be reticent about making
value judgements, they are usually much clearer in their own personal lives.
More research is required into how lay ethical practices are often confusing and
contradictory, partly because ordinary individuals think and act in piecemeal
fashion, so that their actions tend to be inconsistent with their beliefs and
values.
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